All cases

Costa Rica Government Ransomware Attack

April – May 2022

Record reviewed: 2026-10-29

RansomwarePeak: DegradationAttribution: High ConfidenceGovernmentFinanceHealthcare
Year
2022
Actor country
Russia (criminal, not directly state-sponsored per public assessments)
Target regions
Costa Rica
Unpeace score
5

Executive Summary

Conti ransomware group attacked multiple Costa Rican government ministries, encrypting systems at the Ministry of Finance, disabling tax and customs platforms, and demanding a $20M ransom (later reduced to $10M). Costa Rica declared a national emergency, the first country to do so in response to a ransomware attack. A follow-on attack attributed to HIVE targeted the social security healthcare system weeks later.

Why This Matters

Costa Rica showed that ransomware can effectively disable a nation's fiscal and health systems, forcing the first-ever national emergency declaration over a cyber attack and elevating ransomware to a sovereign-level threat.

Escalation Profile

7-Dimension Profile

Escalation Ladder

Probing
Intrusion
Disruption
Degradation
Destruction
Strategic

Phases

2022-04-12
Intrusion

Initial government network compromise

Conti gained access to the Ministry of Finance network, exfiltrating data and pre-positioning for encryption.

2022-04-18
Disruption

Multi-ministry encryption

Tax collection, customs, and import/export systems taken offline; ~672 GB of government data exfiltrated and partially leaked.

2022-05-08
Degradation

National emergency declaration

President Chaves declared a national emergency; HIVE subsequently attacked the social security health system (CCSS), disrupting hospital operations.

Thresholds Crossed

  • •Civilian service harm

Significance

  • •First country to declare a national emergency over ransomware
  • •Demonstrated that ransomware can functionally incapacitate the fiscal apparatus of a nation-state

Restraint Factors

  • •Attackers offered decryption for ransom, coercive but not purely destructive
  • •No reported impact on life-safety systems

Attribution Assessment

High ConfidenceConti ransomware group (Russian-speaking criminal organization); follow-on attack attributed to HIVE
Russia (criminal, not directly state-sponsored per public assessments)
ContiWizard SpiderHIVE
1. Technical

Threat actor mapped to Russia (criminal, not directly state-sponsored per public assessments) based on infrastructure analysis, malware attribution, and operational patterns.

2. Political / Legal
No formal state response
  • •US offered $10M reward for information on Conti leadership
  • •US and allied assistance to Costa Rica for incident response
  • •Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) coalition cited Costa Rica as motivating case

Sources: Costa Rica Presidential Decree of National Emergency; US State Department: Reward Offer for Conti Leadership; CISA: Conti Ransomware Advisory AA21-265A (updated)

3. Open Source

No dedicated journalistic sources in dataset. See sources section for full references.

“High Confidence” reflects available public evidence. All assessments carry inherent uncertainty and should be read alongside source material.

Unpeace Position

5

Unpeace Score

Severity on the peace–conflict spectrum (1–10): peak tier and thresholds crossed

Stable
Contested
Escalatory
03060100

Governance response (separate axis)

0 formal responses. Analyst judgements: norm violation.

Unpeace · score breakdown

5/10
Escalation peak4 × 1.2 = +4.8

Peak tier reached (degradation), ranked 1–6.

Thresholds crossed1 × 1 = +1

From the closed list: civilian service harm.

Before rounding 4.8= 5/10

1 + 9 × (1.2 × peak + thresholds − 1.2) ÷ 11, rounded (range 1–10, no cap; governance is a separate axis). These weights are an interpretive heuristic, not a validated metric — see the scoring methodology for rationale and limits.

Entanglement · score breakdown

3/10
Sectors affected3 × 1 = +3

Distinct sectors in targetSectors.

Countries1 × 1 = +1

ISO country codes in targetCountries.

Baseline offset1 × -1 = -1

Constant offset so a single-sector, single-country event scores 1.

Before rounding 3= 3/10

clamp( sectors + countries − 1, 1, 10 ). These weights are an interpretive heuristic, not a validated metric — see the scoring methodology for rationale and limits.

Coercive Function

Ransomware

Denial of access through encryption, coercive value through economic extortion and operational disruption.

Thresholds crossed

  • •Civilian service harm

Entanglement Risk

Entanglement score3

Sectors affected

GovernmentFinanceHealthcare

Countries / regions

Costa Rica

Impact summary

Tax and customs systems offline for weeks; national emergency declared; healthcare disrupted by follow-on attack.

Infrastructure Meaning

Malware / tooling

ContiHIVE

Capability profile

Tax and customs systems offline for weeks; national emergency declared; healthcare disrupted by follow-on attack.

3 ATT&CK techniques mapped — see ATT&CK mapping below.

Governance Analysis

Governance Flags

!Norm Violation (analyst judgement)
APublic Attribution
SSanctions Imposed
IIndictment
UUN Discussion
RRegulatory Change
CInternational Cooperation
DDeterrence Signal (analyst judgement)

Norms invoked

  • •Protection of government services and public welfare infrastructure
  • •Responsible state behavior: preventing criminal groups from operating with impunity

Policy responses

  • •US offered $10M reward for information on Conti leadership
  • •US and allied assistance to Costa Rica for incident response
  • •Counter Ransomware Initiative (CRI) coalition cited Costa Rica as motivating case

Regulatory changes

  • •Costa Rica accelerated national cybersecurity strategy and institutional reforms
  • •Reinforced international momentum for the Counter Ransomware Initiative

Governance impact assessment

Made the strategic threat of ransomware to sovereign governance undeniable, strengthening the case for treating ransomware groups as national security threats rather than mere criminal nuisances.

Rules whose application to this operation is debated in the literature. These are analytical questions, not findings — the Atlas records where a case sits in legal debate, it does not adjudicate legality (see methodology §09).

Tallinn Manual 2.0

  • Rules 14, 15 and 17, State Responsibility and Attribution

    Conti's Russian nexus tested the boundary between criminal autonomy and state acquiescence

Explore the full Legal Mapper

Sources

Sources listed reflect publicly available materials used to construct this case entry. Inclusion does not imply endorsement. Where no URL is provided, the source may be found via its title and date.