Compare
Side-by-side comparison of cases across escalation, infrastructure, and governance dimensions. Select two or more cases to analyze commonalities and divergences.
Sample comparison (NotPetya vs Stuxnet). Pick cases from the sidebar to build your own — the URL updates so any comparison is shareable.
June 2017 · Russia
circa 2007 – 2010 · United States / Israel
Comparative Profile
0–100 · derived heuristicAxes normalise each case to a 0–100 scale from the same heuristic fields used elsewhere in the Atlas (peak tier, sector/country spread, governance-response density, attribution strength, entanglement). A comparison aid, not a measurement.
Unpeace Score
DifferentKey Metrics
Different100
Unpeace
5
Entanglement
6/6
Peak Tier
90
Unpeace
4
Entanglement
5/6
Peak Tier
Escalation Profile
Attribution
DifferentGRU (Main Intelligence Directorate)
Widely attributed to a joint US–Israeli operation
Target Sectors
Partial overlapUkraine, Global
Iran
Threshold Crossings
- ·First cyber operation to cause >$10B in collateral economic damage
- ·Indiscriminate global propagation beyond intended target set
- ·First known cyber operation to cause physical destruction of industrial equipment
- ·Demonstrated that cyber means can achieve strategic effects previously requiring kinetic action
Restraint Factors
- ·Disguised as criminal ransomware, providing deniability
- ·No direct military targeting
- ·Highly targeted, designed to affect only specific Siemens S7-315/417 configurations
- ·No broader disruption to Iranian civilian infrastructure intended
Governance Flags
Partial overlapGovernance Impact
Established precedent for multilateral public attribution of destructive cyber operations and highlighted supply chain risk as a policy priority.
Norms invoked
- UN GGE 2015 norm against damaging critical infrastructure
- Due diligence obligations (Tallinn Manual Rule 6)
Opened the global debate on whether cyber operations can constitute acts of force under international law, and catalyzed both defensive and offensive cyber investment worldwide.
Norms invoked
- Sovereignty and non-intervention (UN Charter Art. 2(4) by analogy)
- Debate over whether cyber sabotage constitutes a use of force
Key Question
“When does a cyber operation targeting one country become a matter of international concern?”
“Does a cyber operation that causes physical destruction cross the use-of-force threshold under international law?”