CEA

Compare

Side-by-side comparison of cases across escalation, infrastructure, and governance dimensions. Select two or more cases to analyze commonalities and divergences.

Sample comparison (NotPetya vs Stuxnet). Pick cases from the sidebar to build your own — the URL updates so any comparison is shareable.

Same across casesDifferent or partial
NotPetya

June 2017 · Russia

DestructiveStrategic Impact
Stuxnet

circa 2007 – 2010 · United States / Israel

SabotageDestruction

Comparative Profile

0–100 · derived heuristic

Axes normalise each case to a 0–100 scale from the same heuristic fields used elsewhere in the Atlas (peak tier, sector/country spread, governance-response density, attribution strength, entanglement). A comparison aid, not a measurement.

Unpeace Score

Different
Stable
Contested
Escalatory
03060100
Stable
Contested
Escalatory
03060100

Key Metrics

Different

80

Unpeace

10

Entanglement

6/6

Peak Tier

70

Unpeace

2

Entanglement

5/6

Peak Tier

Escalation Profile

Attribution

Different
Confirmed

GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate)

SandwormVoodoo BearIRIDIUM
Moderate Confidence

Widely attributed to a joint US–Israeli operation

Olympic Games

Target Sectors

Partial overlap
TransportationManufacturingCritical Infrastructure

Ukraine, Global

EnergyCritical Infrastructure

Iran

Thresholds Crossed

  • ·Civilian service harm
  • ·Unintended spillover
  • ·Physical effects
  • ·Unintended spillover

Restraint Factors

  • ·Disguised as criminal ransomware, providing deniability
  • ·No direct military targeting
  • ·Highly targeted, designed to affect only specific Siemens S7-315/417 configurations
  • ·No broader disruption to Iranian civilian infrastructure intended

Governance Flags

Partial overlap
!Norm Violation (analyst judgement)
APublic Attribution
SSanctions Imposed
IIndictment
UUN Discussion
RRegulatory Change
CInternational Cooperation
DDeterrence Signal (analyst judgement)
!Norm Violation (analyst judgement)
APublic Attribution
SSanctions Imposed
IIndictment
UUN Discussion
RRegulatory Change
CInternational Cooperation
DDeterrence Signal (analyst judgement)

Governance Impact

Established precedent for multilateral public attribution of destructive cyber operations and highlighted supply chain risk as a policy priority.

Norms invoked

  • UN GGE 2015 norm against damaging critical infrastructure
  • Due diligence obligations (Tallinn Manual 2.0, Rule 6 – Due diligence (general principle))

Opened the global debate on whether cyber operations can constitute acts of force under international law, and catalyzed both defensive and offensive cyber investment worldwide.

Norms invoked

  • Sovereignty and non-intervention (UN Charter Art. 2(4) by analogy)
  • Debate over whether cyber sabotage constitutes a use of force

Key Question

“When does a cyber operation targeting one country become a matter of international concern?”

“Does a cyber operation that causes physical destruction cross the use-of-force threshold under international law?”