← All Actors

Scattered Spider

Non-state: loosely organized English-speaking individuals (US/UK)

Mission Type

Financial extortion through social engineering and ransomware

Primary Sectors

TechnologyFinanceMultiple

Operational Period

2022 – present

Attributed Cases

1

Attributed Cases

Activity Timeline

  1. 2023MGM / Scattered SpiderRansomware

Attribution Basis

How firmly each operation is tied to this actor, and by whom. Confidence reflects the weight of public evidence, not intelligence-community ground truth (see methodology §08).

MGM / Scattered SpiderHigh Confidence

Attributed by US Government, Academic/Private Sector · Consequences: Indictment

TTP Pattern Summary

Scattered Spider relies primarily on social engineering rather than technical exploitation: vishing (voice phishing) of helpdesks, SIM swapping, and impersonation to obtain credentials and MFA resets. Once inside, the group uses identity provider manipulation and cloud console access for persistence. Operates as an affiliate of ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware-as-a-service.

Initial Access (2)Impact (1)Persistence (1)

Behavioural Signature

Scattered Spider demonstrates that loosely organized criminal groups composed of young individuals can cause enterprise damage comparable to state actors. Their exclusive reliance on social engineering as an initial vector, bypassing technical controls entirely, has forced a reassessment of identity and helpdesk security as critical attack surfaces. The group's English-language proficiency distinguishes it from Russian-speaking ransomware ecosystems.

Governance Footprint

Operations prompted FBI/CISA joint advisory (Nov 2023). MGM/Caesars incidents were among the first subject to SEC cyber disclosure rules. Multiple members arrested in the US and UK (2024), demonstrating that domestic law enforcement can reach non-state cyber actors more effectively than state-sponsored ones.