All cases

Scattered Spider – MGM Resorts & Caesars Entertainment

September 2023

Record reviewed: 2026-10-29

RansomwarePeak: DegradationAttribution: High ConfidenceHospitality
Year
2023
Actor country
United States / United Kingdom (individuals; not state-sponsored)
Target regions
United States
Unpeace score
4

Executive Summary

The Scattered Spider threat group, composed largely of English-speaking individuals using social engineering and SIM-swapping, compromised MGM Resorts and Caesars Entertainment. Caesars reportedly paid approximately $15M in ransom. MGM refused to pay; the resulting disruption took hotel and casino systems offline for over a week, with estimated losses exceeding $100M. The incidents highlighted the effectiveness of social engineering against helpdesk and identity systems.

Why This Matters

MGM/Caesars showed that social engineering by loosely organized criminal groups can paralyze major enterprises as effectively as sophisticated malware, exposing identity and helpdesk processes as critical policy-relevant attack surfaces.

Escalation Profile

7-Dimension Profile

Escalation Ladder

Probing
Intrusion
Disruption
Degradation
Destruction
Strategic

Phases

2023-08
Intrusion

Social engineering of helpdesk

Attackers impersonated employees to IT helpdesks to obtain credentials and MFA resets, bypassing technical controls through human vectors.

2023-09-10
Disruption

Ransomware deployment and system shutdown

ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware deployed across MGM infrastructure; hotel check-in, slot machines, restaurant POS, and loyalty systems went offline for over a week.

2023-09
Degradation

Extended operational impact

MGM operated on manual processes for days; estimated losses exceeded $100M. Caesars paid ~$15M ransom to avoid similar disruption.

Thresholds Crossed

None of the five listed thresholds.

Significance

  • •Demonstrated that social engineering alone can defeat sophisticated technical security at major enterprises
  • •Highlighted that young, loosely organized groups can cause damage comparable to state-sponsored actors

Restraint Factors

  • •Financially motivated, no geopolitical or destructive intent
  • •Attackers offered decryption for payment, consistent with criminal ransomware model

Attribution Assessment

High ConfidenceScattered Spider, a loosely organized English-speaking threat group acting as an ALPHV/BlackCat ransomware affiliate
United States / United Kingdom (individuals; not state-sponsored)
Scattered SpiderUNC3944Octo Tempest0ktapus
1. Technical

Threat actor mapped to United States / United Kingdom (individuals; not state-sponsored) based on infrastructure analysis, malware attribution, and operational patterns.

2. Political / Legal
No formal state response
  • •FBI and CISA joint advisory on Scattered Spider (Nov 2023)
  • •SEC required MGM and Caesars to disclose incidents under new cyber disclosure rules
  • •Multiple Scattered Spider members subsequently arrested in the US and UK (2024)

Sources: SEC: Caesars Entertainment Form 8-K (cybersecurity incident); CISA/FBI Advisory AA23-320A: Scattered Spider; SEC: MGM Resorts International Form 8-K

3. Open Source
  • Wall Street Journal: Caesars paid roughly half of a $30 million ransom demand(2023-09-14)

“High Confidence” reflects available public evidence. All assessments carry inherent uncertainty and should be read alongside source material.

Unpeace Position

4

Unpeace Score

Severity on the peace–conflict spectrum (1–10): peak tier and thresholds crossed

Stable
Contested
Escalatory
03060100

Governance response (separate axis)

1 formal response: regulatory change.

Unpeace · score breakdown

4/10
Escalation peak4 × 1.2 = +4.8

Peak tier reached (degradation), ranked 1–6.

Thresholds crossed0 × 1 = 0

None of the five listed thresholds.

Before rounding 3.9= 4/10

1 + 9 × (1.2 × peak + thresholds − 1.2) ÷ 11, rounded (range 1–10, no cap; governance is a separate axis). These weights are an interpretive heuristic, not a validated metric — see the scoring methodology for rationale and limits.

Entanglement · score breakdown

1/10
Sectors affected1 × 1 = +1

Distinct sectors in targetSectors.

Countries1 × 1 = +1

ISO country codes in targetCountries.

Baseline offset1 × -1 = -1

Constant offset so a single-sector, single-country event scores 1.

Before rounding 1= 1/10

clamp( sectors + countries − 1, 1, 10 ). These weights are an interpretive heuristic, not a validated metric — see the scoring methodology for rationale and limits.

Coercive Function

Ransomware

Denial of access through encryption, coercive value through economic extortion and operational disruption.

Entanglement Risk

Entanglement score1

Sectors affected

Hospitality

Countries / regions

United States

Impact summary

MGM systems offline for 10+ days with >$100M in losses; Caesars paid ~$15M ransom; customer data exfiltrated at both companies.

Infrastructure Meaning

Malware / tooling

ALPHVBlackCat

Capability profile

MGM systems offline for 10+ days with >$100M in losses; Caesars paid ~$15M ransom; customer data exfiltrated at both companies.

4 ATT&CK techniques mapped — see ATT&CK mapping below.

Governance Analysis

Governance Flags

!Norm Violation (analyst judgement)
APublic Attribution
SSanctions Imposed
IIndictment
UUN Discussion
RRegulatory Change
CInternational Cooperation
DDeterrence Signal (analyst judgement)

Norms invoked

  • •Corporate duty of care for customer data and operational resilience
  • •Debate over ransom payment regulation

Policy responses

  • •FBI and CISA joint advisory on Scattered Spider (Nov 2023)
  • •SEC required MGM and Caesars to disclose incidents under new cyber disclosure rules
  • •Multiple Scattered Spider members subsequently arrested in the US and UK (2024)

Regulatory changes

  • •SEC cyber incident disclosure rules (effective Dec 2023) applied to both companies
  • •Renewed Congressional interest in regulating ransom payments

Governance impact assessment

Accelerated the SEC's practical enforcement of new cyber disclosure requirements and re-centered policy attention on identity security and social engineering as enterprise-critical risks.

Sources

Sources listed reflect publicly available materials used to construct this case entry. Inclusion does not imply endorsement. Where no URL is provided, the source may be found via its title and date.